




The development and application of new 
genetic technologies has the potential to 
provide significant benefits for health care. For 
patients, the potential benefits are improved 
knowledge about the risks of developing 
disease; the opportunity to mitigate risks 
through behaviour modification, screening 
or preventive treatment; and an opportunity 
to make more informed choices (Salari et al. 
2012). For health care providers, there may 
be increased capacity to predict response 
to treatment and to target treatments more 
effectively, leading to greater certainty and 
potentially better health outcomes for their 
patients (Patel 2014). Instead of treating 
100 people, with 10 per cent showing a 
response to treatment, 10 people identified 
through genomic testing could be treated 
with a 100 per cent response. However, all 
100 individuals will require testing initially, 
and other treatments may be indicated for 
some of the other 90. This has the potential 
to decrease the cost of clinical trials and the 
time-to-market for new drugs. For industry, 
new technologies lead to new marketable 
products and potentially new sources of 
profit (Marketwatch 2014). The emergence 
of the capacity to identify genetic markers 
has, in some cases, rescued treatments 
previously thought to be ineffective or 
harmful, but which may be effective for a 
targeted population. For the health system, 
genetic technologies have the potential to 
lead to more targeted treatment, reducing 
health care expenditure on treatments that 
are unlikely to lead to benefits and improving 
overall efficiency. However, these new genetic 
technologies can also have significant costs, 
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and many of the benefits remain uncertain 
(Deverka et al. 2010). The balance of costs 
and benefits will differ when considered from 
different perspectives in the health system 
and society. 
In the short term, there are likely to be 
increased costs associated with new 
treatments and tests (Filipova-Neumann and 
Hoy 2014; Gazouli and Souliotis 2014). From 
the point of view of manufacturers of health 
care technologies, genetic technologies have 
the potential for increased revenue from new 
tests and treatments. But, in Australia, as in 
most developed health care systems, the 
prices paid for new technologies are generally 
related to the health outcomes gained, and 
the capacity to target may lead to higher 
prices for targeted treatments. This may 
have a direct impact on health expenditure 
through government-funded programs 
if there are excess profits or improved 
outcomes that are not offset by reductions 
in the number of people treated. Where new 
technologies are not funded or only partially 
funded by government, and especially during 
the period when new and old systems run 
in parallel, patients will face higher health 
care costs in terms of insurance premiums or 
out-of-pocket costs, often at levels that are 
beyond the reach of average income earners. 
This raises questions of equity of access to 
new technologies. It is also worth noting 
that the information from genetic screening 
is often indicative rather than definitive. As 
a result, there may be patients who undergo 
unnecessary treatment that entails costs and 
risks but does not provide benefit. Patients 
may also experience increased anxiety about 
potential future health outcomes and may 
choose, as a result, to seek more frequent 
follow-up and treatment even when this does 
not confer a health benefit (Hall et al. 1998). 
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There is also potential for increased anxiety 
if the ability to identify a risk of disease in an 
individual has outpaced the development of 
treatment options for that condition.
This chapter broadly examines the economic 
implications of these new technologies for 
the health care system. The gains in health 
may bring considerable benefits to Australian 
society, provided the associated costs are 
reasonable. Direct costs will include charges 
for genomic and other omic analysis. Even 
though the cost of DNA sequencing is falling 
rapidly, and is now in the order of US$1,000 
for a complete genomic sequence, including 
interpretation, it is still considerable if applied 
to a population. Indirect costs, especially the 
costs of training existing and new staff in the 
delivery of genomic information for health 
benefit, will also be high. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 8, both the 
skills and the equipment used in precision 
medicine and gene editing are the same 
as those used in agriculture and veterinary 
medicine and are relevant to sport and 
defence. The application of medical research 
is a highly competitive area of technology 
and, although Australia has some strengths 
in biotechnology, it is even stronger in 
agricultural innovation, where many 
commercial applications exist.
An estimate of the costs and benefits of 
precision medicine depends on how health 
care is funded, how value for the health 
dollar is determined and how the health 
technology market is regulated. Australia is a 
mixed public and private health care system 
(The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
2016). This raises the question of what should 
be covered under universal health insurance 
(Medicare) and what should be left to private 
funding. Australia has a well-developed health 
technology assessment (HTA) approach, but 
evaluating genetic tests and genomically 
guided treatments presents new challenges. 
The rapid development of this technology 
is leading to lower upfront testing costs, 
although these may result in increased use 
of high-cost interventions, which presents 
challenges for market regulation. Further, the 
availability of low-cost testing may result in 
increased demand for treatments that may 
not yet have demonstrated benefits or for 
which the capacity for harm remains unknown 
(Miller et al. 2002). The medical market is 
becoming internationalised, and the fact that 
Australian medicine is regarded as safe and 
well-regulated should allow entrepreneurial 
medical units to become international centres 
for genomic diagnosis and treatment.
7.2 Public and private 
payer systems
Health care in Australia is financed primarily 
by government, accounting for about 
two-thirds of health care expenditure (The 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
2016). The other main sources of finance are 
private health insurance and out-of-pocket 
expenditure. Funds are then expended 
through both public and private sectors. 
Medicare provides subsidies for treatment 
delivered by private medical practitioners, 
including diagnostic testing. Private health 
insurance covers private in-hospital treatment 
and general (largely dental) and other 
ancillary services and is prohibited from 
covering out-of-hospital services provided 
under Medicare. Over the past decade, there 
have been a series of initiatives using both 
subsidies and penalties to encourage the 
uptake of private insurance (e.g. the Australian 
Government private health insurance rebate). 
Slightly less than half the population have 
private insurance (Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority 2017) at a cost of 
A$6.5 billion in public funding in the form 
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of rebates (Hawthorne 2016). Consequently, 
significant public funds have been directed 
to supporting the private health insurance 
industry and, by extension, the private health 
care sector.
The result of these complex arrangements 
is that any episode of care may be funded 
through different mechanisms and from 
different sources. We will consider the 
application of precision medicine to cancer 
treatment, as much of its cutting-edge 
application has occurred in oncology. The use 
of precision medicine will generally involve 
initial testing to determine the genetic make-
up of the patient and the changes that have 
occurred in the genome of the tumour. The 
results of those tests may provide information 
that will allow the clinician to recommend 
the most appropriate therapy, particularly 
where there is a targeted treatment available 
or where there is information about potential 
harms of some therapies. 
Consider a diagnostic test for a cancer that 
has an associated genomic marker with a 
potential targeted medicine. The test may 
or may not be covered by the MBS, but it 
may entail a consultation with a specialist, 
a biopsy and pathology tests, and will likely 
involve a private provider. The extent to 
which patients must pay out of their own 
pocket in the community setting will depend 
on the fees charged by their provider and 
the Medicare Schedule Fee. The Extended 
Medicare Safety Net (introduced in 2004) 
provides some additional financial protection 
for those patients who incur unusually high 
out-of-pocket costs (and higher costs for 
government) relating to Medicare services 
delivered in the out-of-hospital sector during 
a calendar year. 
However, many different types of genomic 
tests are not listed on the MBS. Through 
their public hospital-linked facilities, state 
governments have established and funded 
genetic services that will offer genetic 
screening, as well as counselling and 
education. Such services are limited in their 
physical location, with different funding 
arrangements across states and territories, 
and they typically cater to people who have 
been identified as being at risk of a genetic 
condition. Any consequent treatment may 
be provided through a public hospital at no 
charge or, if the patient has private insurance, 
they may elect to be treated privately in a 
public hospital or in a private hospital. Each 
of these alternatives involves different costs 
for the patient, the private insurer and the 
state and federal governments. Subsidies may 
also distort the distribution of government 
benefits. These considerations also affect the 
ethical issues regarding distributive justice 
and the preferential allocation of resources to 
those with the greatest clinical needs.
7.2.1 Insurance
Medicare provides universal tax-financed 
comprehensive insurance, but it does 
not cover all health care services. This 
is particularly the case for emerging 
technologies that have not yet undergone 
HTA. The process by which new technologies 
are assessed for public subsidy is discussed 
in Section 7.4.1. In the context of precision 
medicine, it is important to note that 
Medicare has been intended to provide 
‘medically necessary services’, which has 
not included population-based screening. 
Major population-screening programs, such 
as those for cervical cancer, breast cancer 
and colon cancer, have been funded as 
separate population health programs. There 
are some advantages to this approach, as 
national screening programs can be designed 
to encompass appropriate counselling, 
education and follow-up and to provide 
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a more efficient approach to recruitment, 
delivery and targeting of services. However, 
once a condition is detected, further 
investigation and treatment are deemed 
medically necessary and covered by Medicare.
The question arises of which genetic 
information testing and treatment 
technologies should be publicly funded. 
An individual pathology test for a specific 
genetic marker (e.g. for a hereditary disease) 
is managed through the evidence-based 
reimbursement decision-making process of 
the Medical Services Advisory Committee 
(MSAC). Genomic sequencing (as opposed 
to genetic testing related to specific risks of 
an individual) may be assessed through this 
process. If such an approach to screening 
becomes widespread, regardless of whether 
it is funded under Medicare, there will be 
inevitable consequent costs on Medicare 
for follow-up and treatment unless the 
fundamentals of Medicare are changed. There 
have also been suggestions that changing 
information can change behaviour in ways 
that can be difficult to predict, sometimes 
leading to avoidance and sometimes to 
seeking additional health care, therefore 
potentially increasing total costs; however, 
further studies are required (Macdonald et  
al. 1984).
Private insurers may choose to cover genomic 
sequencing, subsequent testing and follow-
up through their general or ancillary products. 
Private insurers are allowed to operate 
‘health businesses’ and some have recently 
established or acquired interests in dental 
and optical centres and primary care. Where 
genomic testing has clear benefits, and 
the tests are not yet covered by Medicare, 
this could be a significant challenge to the 
equity of the Australian health care system. 
Even when the benefits are not clearly 
demonstrated, this introduces differential 
access. 
7.2.2 Assessment of risk factors
Genomic testing will provide more precise 
familial information about individual risk 
factors. These results may have implications 
for a person’s relatives even if they choose not 
to be tested. This risk assessment may alter 
eligibility for private health insurance, other 
insurance and occupation selection.
Although private health insurance in Australia 
is community rated (so individual risk should 
not affect the premium charged), firms do 
attempt to encourage healthy people (‘better 
risks’) to take out insurance by, for example, 
targeting policies to young people. Genomic 
testing could provide new approaches to 
favourable risk selection and while this will 
improve private firms’ profitability, it runs 
counter to the social goals of community 
rating for private health insurance. Should 
firms be obliged to provide cover to 
individuals with known conditions where the 
probability of an insurance payout becomes 
higher, or to provide packages that cover all 
conditions? There are also questions relevant 
to the individual’s responsibility to disclose 
risk and, equally, at what point they should 
seek treatment. 
The same issues arise in the context of other 
insurance, where the markets are not as highly 
regulated – particularly life insurance and 
income protection, although we may also 
include travel insurance. 
Finally, more precise information may provide 
insights into risks associated with certain 
occupations. In the future, this may benefit 
the individual in selecting an occupation 
and could also be valuable to employers 
in recruiting staff. It is feasible that, just as 
psychological testing for job attributes has 
become widespread, employers could seek 
genomic testing as one basis of candidate 
selection. This has implications for regulation 
in terms of mandating the pooling of risks 
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and the level at which this risk pooling 
should occur for the population. Further, 
this raises concerns about an increased 
risk of discrimination against individuals by 




The previous section identified how, in 
Australia’s mixed public-private system, the 
developments of precision medicine can 
lead to changes in the costs of health care 
and the distribution of those costs across 
governments and individuals. The way that 
these new technologies are financed and 
funded has a significant bearing on the 
efficiency, equity and sustainability of the 
system. It is also important to recognise 
that the funding mechanism will have 
consequences; for example, fee-for-service 
models will generally result in increased 
volumes of services offered or provided. 
New technologies generally have high 
overhead costs associated with the process 
of discovery and bringing them to market. 
Funding mechanisms that recompense these 
fairly and provide incentives for additional 
advancement, while not allowing providers  
to capture abnormally high profits, should  
be considered. 
7.4 Costs of 
implementation
The costs of implementation can be 
considered in two categories: 
• The cost of providing the service based  
on the technology itself; and
• The need for associated infrastructure.
The cost of any service delivery is a 
combination of fixed and variable costs.  
The relationship between the two determines 
whether there are economies of scale. In 
many health care services, there are volume-
outcome relationships, whereby a minimum 
level of activity is required to ensure good 
quality outcomes. Investigation of economies 
of scale, economies of scope and volume-
outcome relationships is required to ensure 
technical efficiency in the delivery of these 
services.
It is important to understand that testing 
in itself does not deliver improved health 
outcomes, but it can provide information 
that serves as a basis for further intervention 
(Cairns and Shackley 1993; Rubin et al. 2014). 
The information changes the consequences 
in terms of health care use and costs. Overall, 
the net costs may be negative or positive 
(but should be weighed against health 
gains, as discussed in Section 7.4.1). It is well 
established that fee for service is associated 
with increased volumes of services provided 
and that some of those services will be of 
little, no or negative benefit. Health reform is 
seeking new funding approaches that provide 
more appropriate incentives for practice. 
Where a service is part of an episode of care, 
bundling those services may well be a more 
effective funding mechanism (Dawda 2015). 
Another consideration is funding mechanisms 
that will enhance care quality. In the 
context of precision medicine, such funding 
mechanisms might ensure that services are 
better targeted to those who stand to benefit, 
and that the use of the resulting information 
leads to the appropriate downstream 
use of health care. The development and 
implementation of such innovative funding 
approaches have not proven easy so far, but 
will have significant effects on the cost of 
delivery.
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There will also be an associated infrastructure 
required for the storage of genetic material 
and the confidentiality of data (see Chapter 6) 
(McGowan et al. 2014). Storage of information 
and the capacity to retest will be important 
because, as more information from research 
becomes available, there may be changes in 
the interpretation of results (e.g. there may 
be retesting of new markers or changes in 
management based on new information 
about the existing and known markers). 
Health information is known to be valuable, 
and there are increasing risks associated with 
cybersecurity. There are also medicolegal 
and ethical implications regarding the 
responsibility to act on information. For 
example, if a test identifies a familial risk of 
a potentially severe condition, should family 
members be informed even though they have 
chosen not to be tested?
7.4.1 Ensuring value for money
Australia has a well-developed process for 
assessing new medical technologies for public 
subsidy, by way of the health technology 
assessment process. The need for a rational 
process, and one that is consistent across 
funding programs in deciding whether 
to fund a new technology, is driven by 
the limited resources available to pay for 
health care. Australia has introduced formal 
structures to assess the cost-effectiveness 
of new technologies, and these are part 
of both the PBS and the Medicare Benefits 
Scheme and are in addition to the regulatory 
structures that are in place to consider the 
safety and efficacy of new technologies.
There have been a number of reviews of 
economic evaluation studies in precision 
medicine (see, for example, Jarrett and 
Mugford 2006; Vegter et al. 2008; Wong et al. 
2010; Beaulieu et al. 2010; Djalalov et al. 2011; 
Antoñanzas et al. 2012; Assasi et al. 2012; Yang 
et al. 2013; Buchanan et al. 2013; Simonds et 
al. 2013; Marzuillo et al. 2014; Miller et al. 2014; 
Phillips et al. 2014). As precision medicine can 
vary in its focus, from screening to targeted 
therapy, and across diseases, it is difficult to 
reach general conclusions about the cost-
effectiveness of the technology. There are 
inconsistencies in the approach taken in 
individual studies and in the ratings of quality 
by reviewers. For example, in an extensive 
review of cost-effectiveness analyses for 
colorectal cancer, Frank and Mittendorf 
(2013) observed significant variability across 
studies, concluding that the key drivers of the 
results were: how the costs for the detection 
of predictive biomarkers were included (not 
at all, only for patients who received the 
targeted agent, for all patients); the clinical 
characteristics of predictive biomarkers 
(sensitivity, specificity, validity, reliability, 
timing, prognostic value, testing sequence 
and incidence); and the data for the targeted 
agent (based on retrospective subgroup 
analyses, incorporating heterogeneity of 
effects, or individualised dosing). However, 
some general findings about the challenges 
for economic evaluation emerge.
Although genetic technologies are just 
another category of new health care 
technology, and so should be assessed within 
the same broad HTA framework, there are 
particular issues that arise in consideration 
of their cost-effectiveness (Grosse et al. 2008; 
Deverka et al. 2010). It is important to identify 
how genomic technologies, and particularly 
different sorts of technologies (e.g. whole 
genome sequencing, tests for specific genes 
or tests for tumour markers), change the 
treatment algorithm at different points and 
what the implications are for treatment. The 
choice of comparative technology against 
which costs and outcomes are assessed is 
another issue (Buchanan et al. 2013). The 
choice of comparator for genomically guided 
cancer care should ideally involve a mix of 
genomic and non-genomic care. Multiple 
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comparators may also be of value, particularly 
when applied to diagnostic tests where there 
is potential for the use of in-house custom 
tests of differing cost and analytical validity.
The choice of perspective is key to identifying 
the scope of outcomes and costs included in 
the analysis. Choosing a narrow perspective, 
such as one that emphasises benefits to the 
health care sector rather than to the economy 
as a whole, may overlook many of the 
potential benefits and costs of genomic-based 
technologies. An example of this is the value 
that consumers may place on information 
provided by genetic tests that potentially 
goes unmeasured or unvalued when the 
study’s perspective is restricted to a health 
system perspective. Similarly, information may 
have a negative value if it increases consumer 
anxiety or concern.
Economic studies of genomically-guided 
cancer care also require appropriate 
timeframes to ensure that all downstream 
costs and benefits are captured. Importantly, 
economic evaluations of many genomically-
guided cancer care technologies are an 
amalgam of two different technologies: 
the test and the treatment. This inevitably 
makes the evaluation more complex and 
generates more uncertainty about some of 
the key parameters of the study, such as the 
sensitivity and specificity of the test results. 
This makes it important to undertake well-
specified sensitivity analyses that can provide 
information on the importance of such 
uncertainty to the overall results.
Current HTA approaches rely on clinical 
evidence produced by clinical trials. Robust 
trials require large groups of homogeneous 
patients to achieve statistical significance. 
In contrast, precision medicine is exploiting 
the differences between individuals to 
better target therapy. This produces a 
challenge in generating scientifically valid 
evidence. Adding to this complexity, scientific 
knowledge is expanding at a rapid rate and 
is likely to change the relationship between 
genetics, disease progression and therapy. 
This complex relationship suggests that it 
is difficult to assess (or predict) the overall 
impact of genomics on the health care  
system in terms of health outcomes, costs  
and delivery. 
The decision-making processes for listing 
pharmaceuticals on the PBS were designed in 
an era when blockbuster drugs, prescribed to 
large groups of patients, were commonplace. 
The additional costs that HTA processes 
imposed on pharmaceutical companies and 
governments (such as the costs of producing 
a health technology report, conducting 
economic evaluations and undertaking 
rigorous assessments) were relatively small 
compared with the overall revenue that 
could be gained by listing a drug on the 
PBS. However, the blockbuster era has gone, 
and the current pharmaceutical market 
is characterised by more therapeutics for 
multiple indications and smaller patient 
groups. This trend is likely to continue with 
expansion of genomically-guided treatments, 
where the patient population is getting 
smaller and the volume of sales for each  
new therapy is decreasing.
Therapeutics with smaller potential markets 
may increase the relative costs of undertaking 
HTA compared with the potential volume 
of sales. Given that the costs of conducting 
an HTA is are relatively fixed (i.e. the costs 
are unlikely to vary much regardless of 
the sales volume), its expense may begin 
to put additional pressure on drug prices. 
These issues may come to the fore with 
the development of precision medicine. 
Under circumstances where the target 
population is small, Australia’s current HTA 
and decision-making processes may become 
too cumbersome, and alternative priority-
setting mechanisms for deciding which 
technologies to adopt and diffuse may need 
to be designed. 
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7.5 Regulation of  
private markets
There are large potential benefits offered by 
precision medicine, alongside the potential 
for increased cost pressures on health care 
budgets. With the rapid development of 
technology leading to lower costs for genetic 
sequencing, and the potential for new 
market-driven opportunities, it is important 
Box 24: Rare disease economics
Rare diseases are typically complex, 
debilitating or life-threatening disorders and 
are a major cause of intellectual and physical 
disability in childhood. About 8,000 rare 
diseases have been identified worldwide, and 
6 to 8 per cent of the Australian population 
are affected (Rare Voices Australia 2017). There 
are an estimated 15,000 new rare disease 
diagnoses in Australia every year (based on 
300,000 births annually), and they account 
for one-quarter of inpatients in children’s 
hospitals at any one time. As advocates have 
argued, although rare when considered 
individually, collectively these diseases have a 
significant economic and health impact. The 
rarity of each of these diseases means that 
diagnosis is often complex, lengthy and can 
require repeat assessments. Once a diagnosis 
has been made, many rare diseases have 
no effective treatment. Improved diagnosis, 
early intervention and prevention could 
significantly improve the quality of life of 
affected patients and reduce the economic 
burden of rare diseases.
The use of precision medicine to diagnose 
rare diseases, particularly whole exome 
sequencing conducted early in the diagnostic 
pathway, has been shown to increase the 
diagnostic rate, provide greater accuracy and 
reduce the cost per diagnosis compared with 
traditional diagnostic pathways (Stark et al. 
2017). Rare diseases are also considered to be 
good candidates for precision therapeutics 
that are capable of treating at the level of the 
gene. Indeed, they have been proposed as 
good targets of gene editing interventions. 
However, the prevalence of individual 
rare diseases means they pose an 
economic challenge to traditional models 
of drug funding. Whereas blockbuster 
pharmaceuticals are designed to be suitable 
for broad swathes of the population, the 
market for a rare disease drug could be as 
small as a handful of patients. In some cases, 
this has led to exorbitantly high prices for 
novel medications. For example, Europe’s first 
approved gene therapy, alipogene tiparvovec 
(marketed as Glybera and designed to 
compensate for lipoprotein lipase deficiency, 
which can cause severe pancreatitis), was 
made available at a cost of US$1 million per 
patient; the drug’s manufacturer recently 
announced it would not be seeking renewal 
for its market licence due to low demand 
(UniQure 2017). Regulatory measures in some 
countries, such as orphan drug designations, 
seek to minimise risk and expedite the work of 
drug development for rare diseases.
to ensure appropriate regulations (and 
incentives) exist to ensure cost-effective 
use of these new technologies. The policy 
response will have to address better targeting 
of genetic tests to population groups, as 
well as influencing and informing patients 
and clinicians about appropriate surveillance 
activities and ensuring that post-market 
surveillance is part of the infrastructure.
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Health care is seen as a growth industry 
by investors in the Australian economy 
because Australians are prepared to commit 
considerable discretionary spending to health, 
the population is ageing and most health care 
services are underwritten by government. 
This provides a context in which private profit 
can conflict with social objectives. Achieving 
an economically sustainable precision 
medicine field will necessitate balancing 
the cost-effectiveness of new technologies 
and treatments with effective mechanisms 
for upholding intellectual property 
rights, including incentives for the parties 
developing those innovations.
7.5.1 Pop-up clinics and  
diagnostic services
New health technologies often provide 
a niche market for new providers to 
specialise and develop new customers. This 
is particularly so when consumers can be 
recruited directly, without referrals from GPs. 
A screening test can be useful as a marketing 
tool and may be offered as a loss leader, 
particularly if covered by Medicare and thus 
eligible for bulk billing. People with positive 
test results can then be recalled for further 
investigation or treatment. Of course, this 
provides an incentive to err on the side of 
classifying more test results as positive and to 
recoup costs on further tests or treatments. 
The development of skin cancer clinics is a 
case in point. These have proliferated and 
have been accompanied by a tendency 
to excise lesions at a rate that is perhaps 
greater than necessary (The Royal Australian 
College of General Practitioners 2014). 
Although such services appear specialised, 
they are usually staffed by generalist trained 
doctors rather than dermatologists (House 
of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Health 2015).
7.5.2 DIY kits
The market for direct-to-consumer genetic 
tests, where consumers submit samples and 
receive information on their genetic profile 
without the mediation of a GP or other health 
care professional, has expanded rapidly, 
facilitated by internet sales and international 
commerce. Some of the most popular tests 
are offered through companies such as 
23andMe and Ancestry.com, which have been 
described as offering recreational genomics. 
23andMe had to withdraw the links of its 
ancestry tests to health information after a 
US FDA warning stated that the company 
did not have data to justify provision of 
all the risk analyses it was offering. It has 
since relaunched with a limited range of 
health-related advice, concentrating on 
SNPs associated with high risk of developing 
several well-characterised diseases, including 
breast cancer and Alzheimer’s disease. The 
motivation for those taking part in tests 
offered by 23andMe or Ancestry.com is 
often an interest in ethnicity or ancestry, but 
the tests also offer access to a great deal of 
genetic information, at a low cost. 
When direct-to-consumer test companies are 
based overseas (as is the case for 23andMe), 
it is difficult to regulate their local use, and 
they are not subject to NATA accreditation 
and inspection. However, more than two 
million people have provided DNA samples 
to 23andMe, which has also entered into 
agreements with pharmaceutical companies 
for the associated data linking gene 
patterns to health. Even though much of the 
information offered by the direct-to-consumer 
companies is accurate and well presented, it 
cannot give the depth of information tailored 
to an individual that would be offered by a 
fully knowledgeable health care provider. As 
such, the potentially adverse consequences 
of this form of testing include possible poor 
110
standards of non-accredited providers, 
variable relevant information, lack of follow-up 
and counselling services, lack of connection 
to other health care providers, consequent 
anxiety for consumers and increased demand 
on in-country health services (to deal with 
the results of such testing, regardless of 
its accuracy or relevance to care). State 
governments and professional societies in 
Australia have recognised the need for proper 
regulation of this market, issuing position 
statements on the role of direct-to-consumer 
tests in relation to the health system (see, for 
example, Australian Medical Association 2012; 
Office of Population Health Genetics 2013).
7.5.3 Pharmaceutical industry
The pharmaceutical industry has the 
potential to benefit from the development of 
targeted treatments, which may command 
substantially higher prices than established 
treatments. Currently, the highest returns are 
made from products for which consumers 
comprise large segments of the population. 
Products that will only benefit a small 
number of patients are less commercially 
attractive. The industry also bears most of 
the costs of drug development (although 
the underpinning basic science is still 
supported by government in universities 
and medical research institutes), and these 
have to be recouped whether the product is 
for a common or a rare disease. To date, the 
Australian Government has recognised the 
need to provide different arrangements for 
the funding of treatments for rare conditions, 
including rare genetic conditions, through 
the Life Saving Drugs Program. The challenge 
is to encourage inclusion of more therapies 
that can be directed towards smaller patient 
groups within the general PBS. It is of note 
that the prices paid by government are often 
related to therapeutic benefit for a particular 
patient group; consequently, the same drug 
could attract different funding in different 
patient groups.
The use of economic evidence in determining 
public funding is a powerful tool for policy 
makers to increase value for health care 
expenditure, but decisions are more uncertain 
where economic evidence is lacking. 
Clinical and economic evidence takes time 
to develop, and patients may be denied 
beneficial treatments in the meantime. One 
response to this challenge is to provide 
coverage alongside evidence development, 
such as through risk sharing arrangements, 
with the condition that more evidence is 
collected and with the supplier at risk for a 
product that proves to be less effective. Thus 
far, risk sharing arrangements have taken on 
many forms:
• Agreements that are designed to limit 
uncertainty regarding costs without 
considering the health outcome 
experienced by the patient. For example, 
a manufacturer pays for a genetic test 
in order for patients to gain access to a 
drug that is subsidised on the PBS for 
individuals with tumours that exhibit 
specific mutations.
• Price volume arrangements that restrict 
the financial liability of the payer by 
placing a cap on their total expenditure. 
These agreements allow the payer to 
be reimbursed if the total expenditure 
exceeds the cap.
• Performance-linked reimbursement 
arrangements that are designed to 
limit uncertainty regarding the cost-
effectiveness of a new drug in the real-
world. For example, under the funding of 
ipilimumab for melanoma, the funder only 
pays for the treatment for those patients 
who respond.
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Box 25: Precision medicine health economics questions for further consideration
Insurance 
• Where should the responsibility for funding 
of genomic technologies fall, particularly in  
a mixed public–private health system such 
as Australia’s?
• Which genomic technologies should be 
funded or subsidised publicly, and what are 
the implications of access through the private 
system in terms of equity and efficiency?
Assessment of risk factors
• What are the implications of genomic 
technologies, including genetic testing 
and precision medicine, for private health 
insurance in Australia?
• Should individuals be required to disclose 
their testing history to insurers, employers  
or others?
• Should insurers, employers or others be 
prohibited from seeking information about 
testing history from individuals?
• What are the implications for other insurance 
markets, including life, income and travel 
insurance?
• Should employers be able to require  
genetic testing?
Cost of implementation
• Are there delivery system implications (such 
as economies of scale, volume–outcome 
relationships) for genomic testing and 
treatment?
• What are the appropriate funding 
mechanisms to ensure efficient provision  
of appropriate and high-quality services?
• Who is responsible for the provision of 
infrastructure associated with genomic 
technologies (including storage of genetic 
information and genetic samples)?
• What are the ethical and legal 
responsibilities for provision of information 
to other parties?
Ensuring value for money
• Are the current structures for assessing 
new technologies, such as MSAC and 
the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory 
Committee (PBAC), appropriate for 
assessing new genomic testing and 
treatment?
• Are structures available for assessing the 
economics of chronic disease prevention 
or onset delay?
Pop-up clinics and diagnostic services
• How should the provision of clinics and 
diagnostic services be regulated to ensure 
appropriate use of these technologies and 
to safeguard patient interests?
DIY kits
• Can direct-to-consumer advertising  
be regulated?
• Can the use of these services be managed 
to ensure appropriate use of these 
technologies and to safeguard patient 
interests?
• Can the quality of laboratories providing 
genomic profiling be regulated, especially 
if they are based outside Australia?
Pharmaceutical industry
• How do we ensure that benefits of 
genetically guided treatment are 
appropriately shared between the 
developer of the technology and the 
taxpayer? 
• How do we design payment arrangements 
for genetically guided treatment to  
ensure a fair sharing of risks between  
the developer of the technology and  
the taxpayer? 
• How can we build on existing data 
collection systems to facilitate monitoring 
for new risk sharing arrangements?
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• Coverage with evidence development 
arrangements that link population-level 
payment or reimbursement to prospective 
data collection.
Despite the obvious attraction, risk sharing 
agreements have frequently been difficult 
to implement (Neumann et al. 2011). 
Some risk sharing arrangements require 
substantial new capacity to monitor costs 
and outcomes of new therapies in real-world 
settings, particularly those that are based 
on performance-linked reimbursement 
arrangements that require patient-level 
outcome measurement. This capacity is often 
lacking or requires substantial investment. 
Thus far, risk sharing agreements have 
typically been established between the 
payer and the pharmaceutical manufacturer. 
However, Ramsey and Sullivan (2014) propose 
that in the case of genomically guided care, 
risk sharing agreements between payers and 
cancer care institutions are worth considering. 
One of the main reasons for this proposition 
is that treatment outcomes are not just 
predicated on the effectiveness of a drug 
but also on the accuracy of the genomic 
tests, as well as clinical decisions of who and 
how to treat. Hence, under traditional risk 
sharing agreements between payers and 
manufacturers, the drug company stands to 
make losses on the basis of decisions that 
are possibly not in its control. Realigning the 
agreement between payers and cancer care 
facilities could address this issue. Under such 
an agreement, the facility receives greater 
flexibility to offer patients new therapeutic 
treatment but bears the financial costs of 
these decisions if certain predetermined 
clinical benchmarks are not met. This creates 
strong incentives within facilities to ensure 
that the most accurate genetic tests are 
offered and that treatments are matched 
to patients most likely to benefit. Despite 
these potential advantages, such risk sharing 
agreements would still require a sophisticated 
data infrastructure to enable outcome 
measurement, as well as measures to protect 
facilities from excessive risks. 
7.6 Cost-effectiveness of 
precision medicine
The economic benefits of precision medicine 
are difficult to assess because they will not 
only depend on the rate at which the cost 
of tests comes down, but also on the extent 
to which the new precision testing can 
be implemented in practice to reduce the 
amount of preventable illness. To ensure 
diagnosis and treatment are considered jointly 
as part of the cost-effectiveness process, 
the PBAC and the MSAC will need to review 
evaluation processes for precision medicine.
Some reviews have found reasonable rates of 
cost-effectiveness and, to a lesser extent, cost 
savings (Berm et al. 2016; Verbelen et al. 2016). 
For example, Verbelen and colleagues (2016) 
found that a pharmacogenetics-informed 
treatment strategy was more cost-effective 
than the alternative in more than half of the 
studies they reviewed. 
113
Yet other reviews have been less conclusive 
(Hatz et al. 2014; Phillips et al. 2014; Douglas 
et al. 2016). For example, Hatz and colleagues 
(2014b) found that ‘personalized medicine 
in terms of stratifying care by genetic 
characteristics seems to be neither more nor 
less economically efficient than conventional 
medicine’.
A common feature of these reviews and 
other commentary has been discussion 
of the challenges in evaluating economic 
benefits of precision medicine technologies 
(Antoñanzas et al. 2015; Lu and Cohen 2015; 
Shabaruddin et al. 2015; Bertier et al. 2016). 
The challenges span both methodological 
and data-availability issues. A particular 
challenge alluded to by Lu and Cohen (2015) 
is identification of the ‘broader impacts on the 
use and costs of related and/or downstream 
health services’.
